Those sympathetic to Kant's moral theory will no doubt hold Baier here as massively unfair to him. More particularly – and once they have recovered their composure – one question they may ask is whether Hume really provides us with an account of what is wrong, indeed morally terrible, about cruelty. There is no doubt given his frequent references to cruelty, especially in his History of England, that Hume was most appalled by it. However what is more doubtful is whether we can find in his moral theory an adequate account of the offence to another that occurs in the case of cruelty, or at least in the case of extreme cruelty. Here the Kantian may press that what Hume lacks is something like Kant's ‘formula of humanity’. While that is a possibility I will consider, what I will argue in the end is that what Hume really lacks is simply an adequate account of the significance of those immediate and unreflective or natural ways in which human beings are moved to respond to the suffering of another.