Despite monographs on him by philosophers such as Martin Heidegger, Karl Jaspers and Jürgen Habermas, and more recently by Manfred Frank and Slavoj Žižek, F. W. J. Schelling's work remains largely unknown. Part of the reason for this stems from Hegel's criticism that Schelling “conducted his philosophical education in public” (1970a: vol. 20, 421), that is, developed no fixed or final system. In consequence, philosophers tend to follow Nicolai Hartmann's (1923–29) account of Schelling, and Fichte before him, as incomplete Hegels (Kroner 1921–24), and not therefore as presenting a philosophy worth studying on its own terms. Even the post-1950s “boom” in Schelling scholarship, although it disputes Hartmann's conclusion, tacitly accepts Hegel's by dividing Schelling's work into roughly five periods, a division that really only Heidegger resists. These periods are: Fichtean (1794–97); philosophy of nature (1797–1800); identity philosophy (1800–1807); the philosophy of freedom (1809–27); and the positive philosophy (1830–54).

Heidegger's 1936 Schelling lectures begin by accepting the mutability of Schelling's thought that Hegel notes, but dispute that these diverse expressions express correspondingly different philosophical positions.

Even when it is accepted that Schelling offered “one … unique standpoint”, the question of what it might be remains controversial.