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3 - Hobbes

Jonathan Gorman
Affiliation:
Queen's University of Belfast
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Summary

As earlier observed in our discussion of Plato's Republic, in response to Socrates a powerful presentation was made by Thrasymachus of the view that “justice consists in the interests of the strong”. This was developed by Glaucon, reporting what he describes as the “common opinion” that justice is unpleasant in itself but is pursued for the rewards it might bring and in the hope of a good reputation. “What they say is”, he continued:

that it is according to nature a good thing to inflict wrong or injury, and a bad thing to suffer it, but that the disadvantages of suffering it exceed the advantages of inflicting it; so, after a taste of both, men decide that, as they can't evade the one and achieve the other, it will pay to make a compact with each other by which they forgo both. They accordingly proceed to make laws and mutual agreements, and what the law lays down they call lawful and right.

“Taste of both” here implies that the ultimate measure of goodness is our own “taste” or, in other words, what satisfies our desires. “According to nature a good thing” amounts to the claim that, against Plato's later position, desire as a measure of “goodness” is not merely a motivational feature of the class of tradespeople but is a feature of human nature in general. It is “natural” to all of us to understand “goodness” or “justice” in this way; in other words, we will find that this is what we all “really mean” by it if we are trying to discover its nature through a kind of dialogue.

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Chapter
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Rights and Reason
An Introduction to the Philosophy of Rights
, pp. 39 - 54
Publisher: Acumen Publishing
Print publication year: 2003

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  • Hobbes
  • Jonathan Gorman, Queen's University of Belfast
  • Book: Rights and Reason
  • Online publication: 05 February 2013
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/UPO9781844653461.004
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  • Hobbes
  • Jonathan Gorman, Queen's University of Belfast
  • Book: Rights and Reason
  • Online publication: 05 February 2013
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/UPO9781844653461.004
Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • Hobbes
  • Jonathan Gorman, Queen's University of Belfast
  • Book: Rights and Reason
  • Online publication: 05 February 2013
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/UPO9781844653461.004
Available formats
×