Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Introduction
- 1 The open question argument
- 2 Emotivism
- 3 Error theory
- 4 Moral realism and naturalism
- 5 Moral realism and non-naturalism
- 6 Quasi-realism
- 7 Moral relativism
- 8 Moral psychology
- 9 Moral epistemology
- 10 Fictionalism and non-descriptive cognitivism
- Questions
- Glossary
- References
- Index
10 - Fictionalism and non-descriptive cognitivism
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Introduction
- 1 The open question argument
- 2 Emotivism
- 3 Error theory
- 4 Moral realism and naturalism
- 5 Moral realism and non-naturalism
- 6 Quasi-realism
- 7 Moral relativism
- 8 Moral psychology
- 9 Moral epistemology
- 10 Fictionalism and non-descriptive cognitivism
- Questions
- Glossary
- References
- Index
Summary
It is one thing to show a man that he is in an error, and another to put him in possession of truth.
(John Locke [1690] 1975: bk IV, ch. 7, §11)We are all pretending the important thing is to keep a straight face.
(Maurice Valency)CHAPTER AIMS
To distinguish hermeneutic fictionalism from revolutionary fictionalism.
To raise some worries for both forms of fictionalism.
To outline and criticize cognitive non-descriptivism.
Hermeneutic and revolutionary fictionalism
It is a mistake to think of fictionalism as one theory that can be split into hermeneutic and revolutionary views; it is better to think of hermeneutic and revolutionary fictionalism as distinct positions.
Hermeneutic fictionalism is a descriptive theory that makes a claim about what our moral practice is like. Revolutionary fictionalism is a prescriptive theory that makes a claim about what our moral practice ought to be like. With this in mind, it is worth considering the following questions when thinking about each theory.
Hermeneutic fictionalism:
Is its description of our moral practice accurate?
Could its description be right even if we do not recognize it as such?
Revolutionary fictionalism:
Is it true that we ought to change our moral practice?
Is it possible to change our moral practice?
Hermeneutic fictionalism
Hermeneutic fictionalists argue that even though most people do not ever recognize it, there are good reasons to think that our moral practice is based on make-believe and that we are involved in a moral fiction.
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- Information
- MetaethicsAn Introduction, pp. 157 - 172Publisher: Acumen PublishingPrint publication year: 2011