Perhaps the single most striking feature of Charles the Bold's relations with Italy and of his interest in things Italian was the large number of Italian mercenaries in his army. That army was cosmopolitan and, besides his own subjects, comprised troops of many nationalities, but by 1476 the Italians were probably the most numerous of these outsiders and were certainly the most important in terms of rank. As we saw in Chapter 1, the duke's attempts through diplomacy to augment his armed forces with contingents from the armies of Naples, Venice and Milan, despite what is sometimes assumed, met with only limited success. Since, therefore, this phenomenon of large numbers of Italian troops serving in the Burgundian army during his reign can be explained only partially by reference to the terms of his treaties with his allies in the peninsula, it is appropriate to consider it more fully here as a separate topic. This chapter will attempt to show how, when and why these mercenaries came to be in the ducal army, to estimate their numbers and to assess their military value and influence.

Charles the Bold's motives for recruiting Italian troops

The last Valois duke of Burgundy was not alone in his admiration of Italian troops. Ultramontanes had been able to appreciate them at close quarters, both in Italy itself — during their own campaigns there in the middle decades of the fifteenth century and earlier (for example, those of the Angevins in Naples, or of the French under Charles VII in northern Italy) — and in their own lands (for instance, the Milanese troops who came to the aid of Louis XI in the War of the Public Weal). A high regard for Italian military expertise and a desire to learn from it were among the few things Louis XI and Charles the Bold had in common.

In addition to these general motives, there were short-termreasons why the duke recruited his Italian mercenaries when he did (mostly in the period between the autumn of 1472 and the early summer of 1473). In the first half of his reign, Charles felt himself to be at a disadvantage in relation to the French king, because Louis always had the initiative on the outbreak of hostilities through the possession of a permanent or standing army.