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Preface

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 March 2017

Paul C. Gilmore
Affiliation:
University of British Columbia, Vancouver
Paul C. Gilmore
Affiliation:
University of British Columbia, Vancouver
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Summary

Logicism, as described by Russell in the preface to the first edition of his Principles of Mathematics, is the thesis

that all pure mathematics deals exclusively with concepts definable in terms of a very small number of fundamental logical concepts, and that all its propositions are deducible from a very small number of fundamental logical principles

In the introduction to the second edition of Principles of Mathematics [126], Russell reviewed the material presented in the first edition and described how some of the views presented there had been modified by his own and others’ work. He concluded the introduction with the following

The changes in philosophy which seem to me to be called for are partly due to the technical advances of mathematical logic in the intervening thirty-four years, which have simplified the apparatus of primitive ideas and propositions, and have swept away many apparent entities, such as classes, points, and instants. Broadly, the result is an outlook which is less Platonic, or less realist in the medieval sense of the word. How far it is possible to go in the direction of nominalism remains, to my mind, an unsolved question, but one which, whether completely solvable or not, can only be adequately investigated by means of mathematical logic.

A nominalist related view of logic and mathematics was expressed by Ayer in Chapter IV of [11]:

the truths of logic and mathematics are analytic propositions

we say that a proposition is analytic when its validity depends solely on the definitions of the symbols it contains.

To pursue this thesis more carefully it is necessary to distinguish between what Frege has called the sense of a symbol and its nominatum or what Carnap [24] has called the intension of a symbol and its extension. For “the definitions of the symbols” must be understood to mean the definitions of their intensions.

Type
Chapter
Information
Logicism Renewed
Logical Foundations for Mathematics and Computer Science
, pp. ix - xviii
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2005

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  • Preface
  • Paul C. Gilmore, University of British Columbia, Vancouver
  • Book: Logicism Renewed
  • Online publication: 30 March 2017
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316755808.001
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  • Preface
  • Paul C. Gilmore, University of British Columbia, Vancouver
  • Book: Logicism Renewed
  • Online publication: 30 March 2017
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316755808.001
Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • Preface
  • Paul C. Gilmore, University of British Columbia, Vancouver
  • Book: Logicism Renewed
  • Online publication: 30 March 2017
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316755808.001
Available formats
×