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14 - Protestant Missionaries and the Centrality of Conversion Attempts for the Spread of Education, Printing, Colonial Reform, and Political Democracy

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 May 2016

Robert D. Woodberry
Affiliation:
National University of Singapore
Timothy Samuel Shah
Affiliation:
Georgetown University, Washington DC
Allen D. Hertzke
Affiliation:
University of Oklahoma
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Summary

Although by signing the United Nations Charter countries pledge to allow religious liberty – including the freedom to proselytize and convert – these provisions are highly controversial and often ignored. In recent years many countries have mobilized pressure to adjust the charter to remove the right of people to proselytize or convert. Many countries and provinces have also passed laws against “incentivized or forced conversion” – a policy that sounds good in theory but it is often abused in practice. The assumption is that religious groups currently offer material incentives in exchange for conversions and the government must regulate conversion to prevent it. Although protests by religious leaders about “forced conversions” are widespread, as of yet, no scientifically sampled evidence has tested how common these types of behaviors are. Often in response to this supposed threat, governments incentivize nonconversion (e.g., preventing Dalit/Untouchable converts from having access to government affirmative action programs, or forcing converts to register their conversion publicly and demonstrate that is was not incentivized – in the process exposing them to social sanction and violence). This suggests that governments’ true motivation is often not free choice, but protecting the interests of dominant religious elites.

However, even in the best scenario, where existing elites do not use formal and informal inducements to preserve the religious status quo, regulating conversion may be more costly than the problem (to the extent it currently exists). Free religious competition may remove problems in a way that is more beneficial to the poor and marginalized. If religious groups actually require conversion in exchange for aid and other sources of aid do not require conversion, poor people will use the groups that entail the lowest cost.

Moreover, sometimes the threat of conversion is necessary to prompt dominant religious groups to pay attention to the needs of the poor and marginalized. Even if we view religion purely in market terms (a limited analogy), “religious service providers” are likely to offer better services at lower cost when they face competition than when they do not, just as restaurants are likely to provide better food at a lower cost if their customers can choose among multiple restaurants. Older restaurants may not like the competition and may seek government regulation to prevent it, but if they are successful, customers are likely to suffer.

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Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2016

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