Stringent conditions must be fulfilled in order for the counterinsurgency approach to achieve a modicum of success. These conditions, without adequate domestic legal direction, put immense pressure on civil-military relations at all levels. These conditions include: (1) a host government in which most of the population can have, or build trust; (2) the ability to handle at least some simultaneity of kinetic action and peacebuilding/nation building without degrading either task; (3) a high degree of functionality (in terms of both resources and human capacity) in the intervener's civilian institutions; (4) the ability of civilians and military to collaborate effectively, requiring a more evolved model of civil-military relations; (5) interveners’ political and military willingness to accept high danger for both military and civilian officials; and (6) persistence over a long period of time.

A Host Government That Can Begin to Build Trust

Counterinsurgency requires a credible and visible alternative to an insurgency: “[T]he real battle is for civilian support for, or acquiescence to, counterinsurgents and local authorities.” This support or acquiescence only comes, however, if the counterinsurgents and local authorities can show capability and willingness to provide for the population's basic needs, to assure the population's reasonable security, and to help in the longer-term effort to provide justice and stability. These are not easy requirements even in a more traditional post-conflict environment, but they are far more demanding in the gray area between war and peace. The first assumption is that there is even a government with which to work. If the interveners have toppled an existing government, or find a collapsed government or only local powers of varying strengths, the task is questionable from the beginning. Depth of knowledge about the local culture and local needs is required before the interveners can help the population create a government on which it can rely. Too often over the past few decades, western countries, and especially the United States, have attempted to create a “mirror image” of their ideal model of a western democracy quickly, down to the last detail of a new constitution and elections. But the formalities were accomplished without regard for the nature of the government installed or in power, as well as the lack of support within the population. This was partly the case in Vietnam. Unfortunately, neither Iraq nor Afghanistan reflected a lesson learned.