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4 - Milošević’s Willing Disciple

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 October 2014

Robert J. Donia
Affiliation:
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor
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Summary

After deputizing Karadžić to thwart the union of the two Krajinas, Milošević increasingly relied on him as a confidant and facilitator of his ambitions in western Yugoslavia. But Karadžić became less Milošević’s abject puppet than his helpful ally in Bosnia. Karadžić willingly – and at times obsequiously – obeyed his mentor’s wishes, but rarely without expressing his own views to the Serbian president. He retained his Bosnian perspective on all matters, sought to advance the interests of the Bosnian Serbs, and extracted numerous concessions in exchange for implementing Milošević’s schemes.

Courting the Bosniaks

Throughout 1991, Karadžić collaborated with Milošević in a campaign to persuade key Bosniak leaders to keep Bosnia within Yugoslavia. He did so without enthusiasm, and in time he grew frustrated with what he knew to be a futile endeavor. Both Karadžić and Miloševic had reasons to favor the “Belgrade Initiative,” the name given to the talks between Serbs and Bosniaks to keep Bosnia in Yugoslavia, but their differing interests tested the relationship between the two men and engendered distrust that foreshadowed more serious disputes to come. Milošević believed that the Bosniaks would support a federated Yugoslavia, and he was prepared to make compromises to retain their allegiance. Karadžić, more familiar with the Bosnian political scene, believed that most Bosniaks had already given up on Yugoslavia and shifted to favoring an independent, unified Bosnia outside of Yugoslavia.

Type
Chapter
Information
Radovan Karadžič
Architect of the Bosnian Genocide
, pp. 85 - 98
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2014

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References

Gow, James, Legitimacy and the Military: The Yugoslav Crisis (London: Pinter, 1992), pp. 46–47.
Hoare, Marko, How Bosnia Armed (London: Saqi, 2004)
Mesić, Stjepan, “Rasprava,” in Magaš, Branka and Žanić, Ivo, eds., Rat u Hrvatskoj i Bosni i Hercegovini, 1991–1995 (London: Bosanski Institut, 1999), p. 130
Kadijević, Veljko, Moje Vidjenje Raspada: Vojska bez države (Beograd: Politika, 1993), p. 38

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