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34 - Fulfilling fiduciary duties in an imperfect world – governance recommendations from the Stanford Institutional Investor Forum

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 April 2014

Christopher W. Waddell
Affiliation:
Olson Hagel & Fishburn LLP
James P. Hawley
Affiliation:
St Mary's College, California
Andreas G. F. Hoepner
Affiliation:
ICMA Centre, Henley Business School, University of Reading
Keith L. Johnson
Affiliation:
University of Wisconsin, Madison
Joakim Sandberg
Affiliation:
University of Gothenburg
Edward J. Waitzer
Affiliation:
York University, Toronto
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Summary

Introduction

From the perspective of a full-time practitioner in US pension and fiduciary law, debate and discussion over the future direction of the law of fiduciary duty and/or the governance structures of pension funds is extremely important. However, in the here and now, under existing fiduciary duty and plan governance constructs, US public pension board members and their staffs are making decisions concerning complex issues that affect the retirement security of more than 28 million Americans covered by public sector defined benefit plans (US Census Bureau and Becker-Medina 2012). They are often doing so in a highly charged environment. While many US systems are well-funded, in a significant number of highly publicized cases systems face the unprecedented twin challenges of coping with unfunded liabilities resulting from market conditions not seen since the Great Depression coupled with plan sponsors that are under tremendous financial pressure to maintain essential public services in the face of declining revenues and are not in the position to provide the increased employer contributions necessary to restore fiscal stability to the funds. Making things even more difficult is the drumbeat of those who would benefit either politically or financially from the demise of defined benefit pension plans for US public employees.

The overwhelming majority of the approximately $2.7 trillion held by 3,400 US state and local public pension plans (ibid.) is managed by lay boards consisting of from seven to thirteen individuals that come to their position by one of three ways: they are either appointed by the plan sponsor, elected from the plan membership or are “ex officio” members that become a member of the pension board because they have been elected or appointed to another public office, such as state treasurer (National Association of State Retirement Administrators 2013). In meetings that are generally open to the public, save for matters involving litigation, personnel or (sometimes) investment matters, these boards consider, discuss and act upon the plan administration, investment and actuarial matters that bear directly upon the system’s ultimate objective of ensuring that sufficient plan assets are available to provide for the prompt and accurate payment of benefits to their existing and future retirees.

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Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2014

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References

AFSCME. 2009. Enhancing Public Retiree Pension Plan Security: Best Practice Policies for Trustees and Pension Systems. Washington, DC: AFSCME. .Google Scholar
CalPERS. 2012. “Fiduciary Duty Questions for CalPERS Board Members,” Fiduciary Training Workshop, December 7.
Center for Audit Quality. 2010. Deterring and Detecting Financial Reporting Fraud: A Platform for Action. Washington, DC: Center for Audit Quality.Google Scholar
Committee on Fund Governance. 2007. Best Practice Principles. Stanford Institutional Investors’ Forum. .Google Scholar
Committee on Fund Governance. 2012. Clapman Report 2.0: Model Governance Provisions to Support Pension Fund Best Principles. Stanford Institutional Investors’ Forum. .Google Scholar
GFOA. 2010. “Governance of Public Employee Post-Retirement Benefits Systems.” .
Laby, A. B. 2004. “Resolving Conflicts of Duty in Fiduciary Relationships,” American University Law Review 54: 106–25.Google Scholar
National Association of State Retirement Administrators. 2013. Composition of Public Retirement System Boards. .Google Scholar
Por, J. and Ianucci, T.. 2001. “Good Pension Governance: An Advocate’s Guide for Improvement,” The NAPPA Report 13 (5).Google Scholar
US Census Bureau and Becker-Medina, E.. 2012. Public-Employee Retirement Systems State-and Locally-Administered Pensions Summary Report: 2010. Washington, DC: US Census Bureau.Google Scholar

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