Our discussion of whether and in what respects deliberation may extend to ends will naturally be advanced by a deeper consideration of the notion of an end (§7). Once this is clarified, I will be able to answer the analytic version of the scope obstacle by showing that deliberation can concern ends (§8). I will also be able to set out more precisely the reasoning underlying the motivational version of the scope obstacle (§9).

ENDS AND FINAL ENDS

Part One's statement of the issue already helped fix the sense of “end” relevant to my argument. We have in mind an item that figures centrally in deliberation about what to do, whether simply by framing problems for the deliberator or also as being subject to deliberation. The three obstacles provide additional hints: The scope obstacle indicates (1) that although ends are relevant in deliberation, it is not obvious that they are what deliberation is about, and (2) that ends are intimately connected with motivation – as, say, ordinary beliefs or logical principles are not. The system obstacle credibly implies that ends are multiple and conflict with one another, giving rise to serious question about which should cede place. The source obstacle allows that some ends are more “final” than others, in that they are recognized as regulating or overriding other ends, at least in certain contexts. Even if there is not a single ultimate end that governs various subordinate ends, ends can be arranged in such a hierarchy.