Cognitive anthropology has been an ongoing enterprise for more than 25 years. In this period much has been learned about the relationship between culture and cognition. This chapter summarizes some of that work. I have tried to organize what has been learned as a series of interrelated propositions with supporting material. These propositions represent not proven facts but rather my assessment of what is most probably the case.

Before the propositions are presented, something should be said about the terms culture and cognition. With respect to human cognition, this essay assumes an information-processing approach based on the model developed at UCSD by Mandler, Norman, Rumelhart, and associates. This model treats the mind as a complex of structures composed of parallel-distributed processing networks. Through these structures events are interpreted, remembered, and acted upon (Mandler, 1984; Rumelhart & McClelland, 1986).

It is assumed here that culture consists of learned and shared systems of meaning and understanding, communicated primarily by means of natural language. These meanings and understandings are not just representations about what is in the world; they are also directive, evocative, and reality constructing in character. Through these systems of meanings and understandings individuals adapt to their physical environment, structure interpersonal relationships, and adjust psychologically to problems and conflicts (D'Andrade, 1985). These systems of meanings and understandings are only one set of variables that influence human behavior; social and evironmental conditions, the distribution of power, economic opportunity, personality characteristics, genetic constitution, and other classes of variables also influence what people do and think.