For a long time, I have been interested in identifying the respects in which scientific inquiry is and is not value laden and have understood my ideas on this matter as a corrective to views advanced by Charles Peirce and John Dewey, in whose tradition I have located my own outlook. Dewey was also interested in the extent to which questions about values could be addressed in a manner exhibiting central features of scientific inquiry. In this volume, I have taken some first steps towards addressing this side of Dewey's concern.

I have had generous help and encouragement from many sources. Ruth Marcus read and commented copiously on an earlier version of what are now the first two chapters, inducing me to remove many errors. No doubt she will not be satisfied with the result, but I am very grateful for her help.

Norbert Hornstein read the entire manuscript and made several suggestions which, together with the comments of two referees for Cambridge University Press, led to a substantial reorganization of the contents of the book. I wish to thank him and the two referees (one of whom identified himself as Ned McClennen) for their kindness. Hornstein also suggested the title of the book. I am, of course, entirely to blame for accepting his suggestion.

Teddy Seidenfeld not only read a large portion of the manuscript, he participated in its construction through his encouragement and his positive contributions to the elaboration of the ideas contained therein.