Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-77c89778f8-sh8wx Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-07-21T15:31:27.055Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

11 - Imperfect competition

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 June 2012

Gareth D. Myles
Affiliation:
University of Exeter
Get access

Summary

INTRODUCTION

In the previous chapters, the assumption of competitive behaviour has been maintained throughout. It is often best to view this as a useful restriction for developing initial ideas and eliminating unnecessary complication. As a representation of reality it is clearly flawed, an observation easily supported by casual empiricism. This chapter relaxes the competitive assumption and reviews some of the major results that have been derived within the framework of imperfect competition.

The first point to note is that there are numerous forms of imperfect competition which vary with respect to the nature of products, the strategic variables of the firms, the objectives of the firms and the possibility of entry. Products may be homogeneous or differentiated and the strategic variables of the firms can either be prices or quantities with, possibly, additional instruments such as investment or advertising. The firms' objectives may be individual profit maximisation or, alternatively, joint profit maximisation. Entry may be impossible, so that an industry is composed of a fixed number of firms, it may be unhindered or incumbent firms may be following a policy of entry deterrence. To avoid some of this complexity, this chapter will focus primarily upon economies with quantity setting oligopoly and homogeneous products although at some points conjectures are introduced to permit flexibility. This form of oligopoly has the advantage of being equivalent to monopoly when the industry has a single firm and, under most circumstances, to competition as the number of firms increases without limit.

Type
Chapter
Information
Public Economics , pp. 348 - 382
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 1995

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×