Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Rational Egoism: A Profile of Its Foundations and Basic Character
- 3 The Master Virtue: Rationality
- 4 Honesty
- 5 Independence
- 6 Justice
- 7 Integrity
- 8 Productiveness
- 9 Pride
- 10 Implications for Certain Conventional Virtues: Charity, Generosity, Kindness, Temperance
- Conclusion
- Appendix: Egoistic Friendship
- Select List of Works Consulted
- Index
1 - Introduction
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 June 2012
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Rational Egoism: A Profile of Its Foundations and Basic Character
- 3 The Master Virtue: Rationality
- 4 Honesty
- 5 Independence
- 6 Justice
- 7 Integrity
- 8 Productiveness
- 9 Pride
- 10 Implications for Certain Conventional Virtues: Charity, Generosity, Kindness, Temperance
- Conclusion
- Appendix: Egoistic Friendship
- Select List of Works Consulted
- Index
Summary
Much recent discussion in ethics has danced around the edges of egoism, as renewed attention to virtue ethics, eudaimonia, and perfectionism naturally raise questions about the role of self-interest in a good life. Although the ancient Greek conception of ethics that is currently enjoying a revival does not fit stereotypes of egoism, it certainly does not advocate altruism. As Rosalind Hursthouse acknowledges, much virtue ethics portrays morality as a form of enlightened self-interest. Although authors increasingly have defended aspects of egoism (see, for instance, David Schmidtz, Jean Hampton, Neera Badhwar), the overwhelming majority of ethicists remains averse not only to endorsing egoism but even to seriously considering it. Those who do speak on its behalf usually urge that we incorporate discrete elements of egoism, such as self-respect, alongside altruistic obligations. Rather than urge that we replace altruism with egoism, in other words, they seek to reconcile select self-beneficial qualities with the altruism that we all already “know” morality demands. This latter assumption remains ubiquitous. Christine Korsgaard's claim that “ … moral conduct by definition is not motivated by self-interest” is typical.
Consequently, the questions raised by these recent developments in moral philosophy have not been adequately pursued. Is eudaimonia a selfish end? What does selfishness actually mean? What sorts of actions does it demand? What are the implications of pursuing eudaimonia for a person's relationships with others?
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Ayn Rand's Normative EthicsThe Virtuous Egoist, pp. 1 - 18Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2006
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