In the “Letters on sentiments” [“On sentiments”] I assumed with Monsieur Maupertuis the following nominal definitions: The pleasant sentiment is a representation which we prefer to have than not to have; the unpleasant, on the other hand, a representation which we prefer not to have than to have. In this definition, however, there is a small error that deserves to be noted. For the smallest error in the basic definition of any subject matter can, in subsequent considerations, lead us astray into the most significant misunderstandings. On the basis of the content of the definition, we would have to despise every unpleasant sentiment and wish to see it purged from our soul and destroyed. If we pay attention to ourselves, however, we notice that, in the case of some unpleasant sentiments, our disgust is not always directed at the representation but very often at the object of the representation. We do not always prefer not to have the representation, as required by the definition, but in very many instances merely prefer instead for the object not to be. We disapprove of the evil that has occurred; we wish that it had not happened or that it stood in our power to make things right again. Once, however, the evil has occurred, and if it has occurred without our being in any way responsible for it and without our being able to prevent it, then we are powerfully attracted to the representation of it and long to acquire that representation.