I present in this chapter an analytical framework for understanding how resources affect the formation of multiethnic opposition coalitions in Africa. I argue that the availability of private resources influences the capacity of politicians to coordinate electoral campaigns that span ethnic cleavages. My claim in this regard is straightforward and unremarkable: money is crucial for politicians who seek to become nationally competitive candidates. What is innovative about this claim – and has not been systematically explored in previous research – is the role that money plays in securing cross-ethnic endorsements.

In patronage-based polities across Africa, politicians must be able to pay upfront for the cross-ethnic endorsements that make up electoral alliances. Incumbents do so easily through the distribution of public resources. Opposition politicians, for their part, must secure private resources, and I argue that they are more likely to do so where the state has relinquished its gatekeeping role vis-à-vis financial capital. Otherwise, incumbents can manipulate the state’s financial controls to deter individual entrepreneurs from supporting their preferred opposition candidates. The opposition’s ability to create multiethnic electoral alliances is thus shaped by the extent to which business depends on state-controlled capital.