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1 - Theories of Scientific Method

from Part I - The Public Cultures of the Physical Sciences After 1800

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 March 2008

By
Nancy Cartwright ,
Stathis Psillos  and
Hasok Chang
Edited by
Mary Jo Nye
Mary Jo Nye
Affiliation:
Oregon State University
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Summary

Scientific methods divide into two broad categories: inductive and deductive. Inductive methods arrive at theories by generalizing from what is known to happen in particular cases; deductive methods, by derivation from first principles. Behind this primitive categorization lie deep philosophical oppositions. The first principles central to deductivist accounts are generally taken to be, as Aristotle described, “first known to nature” but not “first known to us.” Do the first principles have a more basic ontological status than the regularities achieved by inductive generalization – are they in some sense “more true” or “more real”? Or are they, in stark opposition, not truths at all, at least for a human science, because always beyond the reach of human knowledge?

Deductivists are inclined to take the first view. Some do so because they think that first principles are exact and eternal truths that represent hidden structures lying behind the veil of shifting appearances; others, because they see first principles as general claims that unify large numbers of disparate phenomena into one scheme, and they take unifying power to be a sign of fundamental truth. Empiricists, who take experience as the measure of what science should maintain about the world, are suspicious of first principles, especially when they are very abstract and far removed from immediate experience. They generally insist on induction as the gatekeeper for what can be taken for true in science.

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The Cambridge History of Science , pp. 19 - 35
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2002

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