Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-5c6d5d7d68-ckgrl Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-08-07T15:40:25.909Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

3 - From Decartelization to Reconcentration - The Mixed Legacy of American-Led Corporate Reconstruction in Germany

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 January 2013

Detlef Junker
Affiliation:
Ruprecht-Karls-Universität Heidelberg, Germany
Get access

Summary

The liberalization of international trade and the creation of an open world economic order were principal objectives of U.S. foreign policy after 1945. A consistent but often overlooked facet of the American attempt to restructure the global economy was the demand for international control of private cartel agreements. Cartels are defined as “agreements between firms in the same branch of trade limiting the freedom of these firms in the production and marketing of their products.” Ranging in form from centralized purchasing and distribution organizations to informal gentlemen's agreements, cartels aim to restrict output, allocate market shares, and fix product prices. According to various estimates, on the eve of World War II, international cartels controlled 30 to 50 percent of world trade, and American businesses participated in 107 out of 179 international cartels. Even though cartels were especially pronounced in sectors such as raw materials, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, and electrical equipment, they “reached into practically every branch of the modern economy.”

The impetus for global decartelization after World War II originated in the American antitrust tradition and the New Deal. In the United States, corporate mergers had been the characteristic form of market regulation and economic concentration, in contrast to Britain and continental Europe, where industrial combinations traditionally had taken the form of syndicates and cartels. Although the Sherman Act of 1890 prohibited monopolization and collusion in restraint of trade, the Clayton Act of 1914 forbade price discrimination, tying contracts, and certain types of intercorporate concentration only in cases where anticompetitive or monopolistic effects could be demonstrated.

Type
Chapter
Information
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2004

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×