Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Foreword
- Part I Strategic interactions as games
- Part II Basic solution concepts for strategic form games
- Part III Prominent classes of strategic form games
- Part IV Uncertainty and mixed strategies
- Part V Advanced topics in strategic form games
- Part VI Dynamic games
- 18 Extensive form games
- 19 Non-credible threats, subgame perfect equilibrium and backward induction
- 20 Commitment
- 21 Backward induction
- 22 Moves of nature
- Part VII Repeated games
- Index
19 - Non-credible threats, subgame perfect equilibrium and backward induction
from Part VI - Dynamic games
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 August 2012
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Foreword
- Part I Strategic interactions as games
- Part II Basic solution concepts for strategic form games
- Part III Prominent classes of strategic form games
- Part IV Uncertainty and mixed strategies
- Part V Advanced topics in strategic form games
- Part VI Dynamic games
- 18 Extensive form games
- 19 Non-credible threats, subgame perfect equilibrium and backward induction
- 20 Commitment
- 21 Backward induction
- 22 Moves of nature
- Part VII Repeated games
- Index
Summary
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- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Game TheoryInteractive Strategies in Economics and Management, pp. 317 - 332Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2012