Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Tables
- Acknowledgements
- Abbreviations and Glossary
- 1 The Anglo-American Relationship and the Need for Historical Interpretation
- 2 The Evolution of Transatlantic Aircraft Supply Diplomacy, 1938–40
- 3 The Diplomacy of Critical Dependency, 1940
- 4 Lend-Lease and the Politics of Supply, 1941
- 5 The Limits of Dependency: American Aircraft in Action, 1940–2
- 6 Heavy Bomber Supply Diplomacy, 1941–2
- 7 The Problem of Quality: the Fighter Supply Crisis of 1942
- 8 Collaboration and Interdependency
- Appendix RAF Air Strength by aircraft type on 3 September 1939, 1940, 1941 and 1942
- Unpublished Sources Cited in Text
- Bibliography
- Index
6 - Heavy Bomber Supply Diplomacy, 1941–2
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 October 2013
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Tables
- Acknowledgements
- Abbreviations and Glossary
- 1 The Anglo-American Relationship and the Need for Historical Interpretation
- 2 The Evolution of Transatlantic Aircraft Supply Diplomacy, 1938–40
- 3 The Diplomacy of Critical Dependency, 1940
- 4 Lend-Lease and the Politics of Supply, 1941
- 5 The Limits of Dependency: American Aircraft in Action, 1940–2
- 6 Heavy Bomber Supply Diplomacy, 1941–2
- 7 The Problem of Quality: the Fighter Supply Crisis of 1942
- 8 Collaboration and Interdependency
- Appendix RAF Air Strength by aircraft type on 3 September 1939, 1940, 1941 and 1942
- Unpublished Sources Cited in Text
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
The Fighters are our salvation, but the bombers alone provide the means of victory.
Winston ChurchillThe critical Allied defeats of 1940 had left the British geographically isolated and confined to a traditional strategy of naval blockade and peripheral ground campaigns, such as that developing in North Africa, designed to wear down a Continental enemy. By 1941, the aircraft involved in the 1940 purchase programme and the consequent ‘3,000 per month’ plans behind Lend-Lease had been clearly directed towards relieving British aircraft production from this peripheral commitment. Yet that commitment was becoming increasingly marginal to British plans for the future. The strategic bombing offensive waged against Germany now became central to British strategy, and obtaining the heavy bombers necessary for expanding this campaign became a new focus of Anglo-American aircraft supply diplomacy after 1940.
Intensifying the strategic bombing campaign required the dedication of enormous production resources. In the first place, wastage, or the loss of aircraft on operations, was substantial. As an example, between July and November 1941, Bomber Command lost 526 aircraft on operations – the equivalent of its entire frontline strength. The most efficient policy to secure the quantity of replacement aircraft needed was to expand further the production of existing types. But this conflicted with the RAF's desire to improve aircraft quality, most notably by the introduction of heavy bombers to replace the medium bombers in service in 1940.
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- The Arsenal of DemocracyAircraft Supply and the Anglo-American Alliance, 1938-1942, pp. 169 - 197Publisher: Edinburgh University PressPrint publication year: 2013