Introduction

Attempts to morally justify the IRA's armed struggle in terms of Just War Theory encounter a number of serious problems. It does not follow, of course, that the IRA's armed struggle was morally unjustified, because it might be morally justified according to the standards of other moral theories. Some scholars have concluded that if terrorist campaigns such as the IRA's can be morally justified at all, it will be in terms of their overall beneficial consequences. It is therefore worthwhile to examine the morality of terrorism in general and of the IRA's armed struggle in particular, in relation to consequentialist moral considerations. An adequate exposition and evaluation of consequentialism itself is beyond the scope of this chapter. My aim is more modest, namely, to understand how consequentialist considerations could be used to morally justify at least some terrorist acts, and then to determine whether any of the IRA's acts of terrorism should be judged as among those so justified. The prospects for such a defence, I will argue, are slim.

Consequentialism

Consequentialism is the moral theory that maintains that the moral status of any action is solely a function of the net positive and negative consequences of that action.