The challenges of complexity unsettle many of the prevailing assumptions in democratic theory. Most important among these is the consensual impetus that lies behind many contemporary articulations of liberal democracy and the rationalism and universalism that frequently underpin them. The notion of a rational consensus has become an increasingly controversial dimension of recent democratic theory, as radical democratic theorists have challenged the ways in which liberal democracies deal with political disagreement and contestation. Subsequently, several theorists within the liberal tradition have attempted to incorporate models of dissent in their democratic arguments or have reiterated the supposedly intrinsic place of disagreement in the organisation of liberal democracies. However, these protestations against the radical democratic critique have tended, in dealing with dissent, to regress into forms of majoritarianism or proceduralism that do little more than reflect the original limitations that inspired the radical critique. This chapter argues that a more useful approach is one that recognises that not only is contestation inherent to democratic politics but also that this generates a paradox of democracy based on the impossibility of establishing rational consensus in democratic practice. This correlates with the complex dimension of democratic politics and provides another challenge to the prevalence of democratic piety in contemporary politics.

The pursuit of consensus is a fundamental element of contemporary democratic theory and practice focused on reconciling different moral viewpoints in pluralistic societies. Consensus is articulated in a multiplicity of ways in contemporary politics, although increasingly influential liberal theorists are less concerned with agreement about substantive moral beliefs and more focused on consensus around democratic procedures (Rawls 1993, Habermas 1996).