According to Deleuze and Guattari the fundamental failure of both psychoanalysis and philosophy lies in the fact that neither is a song of life. Both sing an unrelenting dirge. I have argued, following Deleuze and Guattari, that this failure is the result of the way that desire is construed as precipitating from a lack. Hegel and Heidegger both accept this fundamental presupposition of a foundational lack, but organise their thought in antinomical ways with regard to this lack. I have argued that the antinomy between Hegel and Heidegger can be understood in terms of mourning and melancholia. I have also argued that this antinomy should be solved mathematically, that is each side of the antinomy should be rejected as false. Or, better, the underlying assumption of desire predicated on a lack that generates the antinomy should be rejected as false. Philosophy remains a sad song, though. What I would like to do by way of conclusion is build on the resources provided by Deleuze and Guattari in Anti-Oedipus and discuss the way that the practice of philosophy might be characterised by joy rather than by sadness. In order to do this I shall look at four crucial engagements with death in the history of philosophy that do not fall into either mourning or melancholia: Epicurus, Spinoza, Blanchot and Nietzsche.