8 - Intentions
from Part III - The Theory Applied
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 12 September 2012
Summary
Intentions as States of Mind that Cause Behaviour
According to the behaviourist model I have been developing, to describe someone's state of mind is to describe the version of practical rationality that the person's way of behaving is governed by. So the idea of my intending to achieve goal G, and therefore of my behaviour being directed to G, may be spelt out by saying that I am disposed to behave in a way that is governed by a version of practical rationality that unconditionally recommends that G is to be achieved.
Suppose that your way of behaving is characterised by a version of practical rationality that recommends that going for a walk is the thing to do if the sun is shining. This version of practical rationality is variable with respect to the answer to the question of whether the sun is shining. The recommendation to go for a walk is a conditional one. And suppose the sun is shining and your way of behaving has properly adapted to this. Then your way of behaving may be characterised for the time being by another more restrictive version of practical rationality – one that unconditionally recommends that going for a walk is the thing to do.
If your behaviour is governed by such a version of practical rationality then going for a walk is your goal. Your way of behaving is directed to this goal. What is the best way of achieving that goal in the circumstances (according to your version of practical rationality) will be recommended. This is what it means to say that you intend to go for a walk.
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- Information
- The Inner Life of a Rational AgentIn Defence of Philosophical Behaviourism, pp. 145 - 160Publisher: Edinburgh University PressPrint publication year: 2006