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6 - Reasons and belief's justification

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 July 2011

Clayton Littlejohn
Affiliation:
University of Texas
Andrew Reisner
Affiliation:
McGill University, Montréal
Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen
Affiliation:
Aarhus Universitet, Denmark
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Summary

INTRODUCTION

There's little to say about justification that cannot be said in terms of reasons. If you Φ and thereby do all that the reasons demanded, it cannot be that you oughtn't have Φ'd. If it's not the case that you oughtn't have Φ'd, there's no further question as to whether your Φ-ing was justified. Having done all that you should, there's no reason left standing to demand that you refrain from Φ-ing. There's nothing that could stand in the way of the justification of your actions or attitudes. Here's our first connection. If you've done all that the reasons demand, nothing prevents your actions or attitudes from being justified. On the other hand, we shouldn't believe or act without adequate justification. When you oughtn't to Φ, there's an undefeated reason that demands that you refrain from Φ-ing. It's because of this reason that Φ-ing is beyond justification and the most you could hope for is an excuse. Think of cases of conflicting reasons. The only way to justify Φ-ing in the face of reasons that count against Φ-ing is to point to considerations that defeat these reasons. If the reasons you need cannot be found (i.e. reasons that defeat the case against Φ-ing), we can say that Φ-ing cannot be justified because there are reasons that demand that you not Φ that are not defeated. Here's our second connection. Fail to do what the relevant reasons demand and your actions and attitudes are beyond justification.

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Reasons for Belief , pp. 111 - 130
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2011

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