Ovid's knowledge of the law was first discussed in 1811 by J. van Iddekinge. This was pioneer work; unfortunately it was antiquated almost at once by the discovery of the Verona codex of Gaius in 1816, and in any case Van Iddekinge exaggerated, as pioneers will, certain aspects of his subject. That Ovid was deeply learned in the law—“juris scientia consultissimus”—can hardly be demonstrated and will not be maintained in this paper. If legal words and ideas crop up not infrequently in his poetry, the same is true of, for instance, Propertius. One fact, however, distinguishes Ovid from the other Roman love-poets who drew on the sphere of law for metaphor and illustration, his attested practical experience of legal matters. It was part of the elegist's credo to despise official, established values and occupations, all the activity summed up in that most Roman word, negotium. But Ovid's father, as he tells us, was ambitious for his son, and pointed out that poetry was all very well but that there was no money in it; and in spite of his dislike of business the future poet of the Metamorphoses was embarked on the initial stages of an official career. It was not long before the tuta otia of literature reclaimed him, but in the interval he had figured in several capacities connected with the administration of the law.