The negotiation of the U.S.–U.S.S.R. grain agreement is a fascinating subject that yields rich insights and lessons from a variety of perspectives. For those interested in decision making, three central themes dominate the sequence of events.

First, there is the interplay of competing interests. One can explore the ways in which departments, agencies, and senior officials seek to advance their policy objectives. One can examine the internal bureaucratic struggles on a cross-cutting issue that engages the interests of several departments and agencies. Not least, one can evaluate the role of the White House in attempting to “manage” policy development on complex issues.

Second, there is the relationship between the policy analyst and the decision maker. Senior officials frequently feel they are at the mercy of expert advisers, dependent on the experts' technical analyses and judgments. Often they receive conflicting expert opinions. Sometimes they are reminded of the uncertainty underlying an estimate or a “fact.” Other times they are not. Leading up to and throughout the grain agreement negotiations, top decision makers sought expert analysis on the consequences of various possible alternatives. The mobilization, organization, and management of information and analysis form an important part of this story.

Third, there is the interaction between formulating a policy and then attempting to implement it. Deciding what to do – establishing the direction of a policy – is one thing. Marshaling the support necessary for its implementation is another.