Preface and acknowledgments

This book seeks to illuminate dilemmas of statecraft in the prevention of nuclear proliferation. It focuses largely – but not uniquely – on experiences in the last two decades, primarily with Iraq, Iran, North Korea, and Libya. These dilemmas make it clear that we are far from reaching a final word on the subject and that our efforts to unpack the paths and effects of external inducements within target states may introduce more questions than can be answered in this salvo. Far from seeking to reach unanimity on a subject ridden with quandaries, the primary aspiration of this volume is to reflect on those cases and experiences with an eye on improving our knowledge of the scope conditions, processes, and causal mechanisms that link inducements to specific outcomes. This entails a better understanding of the domestic distributional costs and benefits of external inducements on target states. At the very least, the effort to concentrate on those causal mechanisms connecting sanctions and positive inducements to outcomes broadens a more typical focus on whether or not such inducements “work.” Not only can assessments of outcomes be overly simplistic but too narrow a focus on outcomes often comes at the expense of a deeper and productive inquiry into why different instruments may or not yield expected effects under particular circumstances.

The main objective was thus not to take sides in the sanctions pessimism–optimism debate. Although there is plenty of that here as well, there is also ample divergence among authors over whether or not comprehensive sanctions work, targeted sanctions are less or more effective, positive inducements are any more efficient than negative ones, what should a right mix of both consist of, and whether or not all types of inducements may have proven futile. We aim not at definitive conclusions – given contested readings of the evidence – but rather at redirecting attention to the anatomy of inducements, the causal processes they unleash in the domestic politics of target states, and the intended, unintended, and unexpected outcomes inducements can yield.