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6 - Routine and problematic readings

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 June 2012

William Twining
Affiliation:
University of London
David Miers
Affiliation:
Cardiff University
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Summary

Routine readings

In this Part of the book we apply the lessons about rules in general that were explored in Part II to the task of reading, interpreting and using the two principal sources of law in the United Kingdom. They are the decisions of the superior courts and the legislative rules enacted in the Westminster Parliament and by the European Union. A central theme is that those who seek to use or rely on rules of law derived from these sources are able to do so, as a matter of routine, without difficulty. Much of the activity of using law is unproblematic in the sense that only exceptionally are issues raised concerning its scope, meanings or application. This is, for example, true for those employed in the regulated industries such as gas, water, electricity, transport and financial services, in executive agencies, local government or other public sector bodies or in private commerce, whose job it is to advise on the application of the law to their activities. It is also so for the solicitor advising private individuals about the buying and selling of their houses, the making or interpretation of their wills, or the myriad of other transactions or events affecting their lives which have a legal dimension.

In saying that in the vast majority of instances the reader of these sources of law is unlikely to be in doubt about the scope or application of a rule of law, we are not saying that the reading of that rule of law is necessarily easy.

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Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2010

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References

Barnes, J., ‘Sources of Doubt and the Quest for Legal Certainty’, Legisprudence, 2 (2008), 119CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Dworkin, R., ‘Hard Cases’, Harvard Law Review, 87 (1975), 1057)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Milsom, S., review of Grant Gilmore, ‘The Death of Contract’, Yale Law Journal, 84 (1975), 1585.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

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