Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-848d4c4894-mwx4w Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-06-17T06:50:36.716Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

1 - Getting to Work

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 June 2012

Paul Milgrom
Affiliation:
Stanford University, California
Get access

Summary

The era of putting auction theory to work began in 1993–1994, with the design and operation of the radio spectrum auctions in the United States. Although the economic theory of auctions had its beginnings in the 1960s, early research had little influence on practice. Since 1994, auction theorists have designed spectrum sales for countries on six continents, electric power auctions in the United States and Europe, CO2 abatement auctions, timber auctions, and various asset auctions. By 1996, auction theory had become so influential that its founder, William Vickrey, was awarded a Nobel Prize in economic science. In 2000, the US National Science Foundation's fiftieth anniversary celebration featured the success of the US spectrum auctions to justify its support for fundamental research in subjects like game theory. By the end of 2001, just seven years after the first of the large modern auctions, the theorists' designs had powered worldwide sales totaling more than $100 billion. The early US spectrum auctions had evolved into a world standard, with their major features expressed in all the new designs.

It would be hard to exaggerate how unlikely these developments seemed in 1993. Then, as now, the status of game theory within economics was a hotly debated topic. Auction theory, which generated its main predictions by treating auctions as games, had inherited the controversy.

Type
Chapter
Information
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2004

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Bertrand, Joseph (1883). “Théorie Mathématique de la Richesse Sociale.” Journal des Savants 69: 499–508Google Scholar
Binmore, Ken and Klemperer, Paul (2002). “The Biggest Auction Ever: The Sale of the British 3G Telecom Licenses.” Economic Journal 112: C74–C96CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cramton, Peter, John McMillan, Paul Milgrom, Brad Miller, Bridger Mitchell, Daniel Vincent, and Robert Wilson (1997). “Auction Design Enhancements for Non-Combinatorial Auctions.” Report 1a: Market Design, Inc. and Charles River Associates, www.market-design.com/files/97cra-auction-design-enhancements-for-non-combinatorial-auctions.pdf
Cremer, Jacques and McLean, Richard P. (1985). “Optimal Selling Strategies Under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist When Demands are Independent.” Econometrica 53(2): 345–361CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Dasgupta, Partha and Maskin, Eric (2000). “Efficient Auctions.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 95: 341–388CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hazlett, Thomas (1998). “Assigning Property Rights to Radio Spectrum Users: Why Did FCC License Auctions Take 67 Years?” Journal of Law and Economics XⅬI(2, pt 2): 529–575CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hendricks, Kenneth, Porter, Robert, and Wilson, Charles (1994). “Auctions for Oil and Gas Leases with an Informed Bidder and a Random Reservation Price.” Econometrica 63(1): 1–27Google Scholar
Jehiel, Philippe and Moldovanu, Benny (1999). “Resale Markets and the Assignment of Property Rights.” Review of Economic Studies 64(4): 971–991CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kagel, John H. (1995). Auctions: A Survey of Experimental Research. The Handbook of Experimental Economics. J. H. Kagel and A. E. Roth. Princeton, Princeton University Press. Chapter 7: 501–585
Kwerel, Evan and Alex Felker (1985). “Using Auctions to Select FCC Licensees,” Federal Communications Commission Working Paper 16
McMillan, John (1994). “Selling Spectrum Rights.” Journal of Economics Perspectives 8: 145–162CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Milgrom, Paul (1979). “A Convergence Theorem for Competitive Bidding with Differential Information.” Econometrica 47: 670–688CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mueller, Milton (1993). “New Zealand's Revolution in Spectrum Management.” Information Economics and Policy 5: 159–177CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Perry, Motty and Reny, Philip (2002). “An Efficient Auction.” Econometrica 70(3): 1199–1212CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Pesendorfer, Wolfgang and Swinkels, Jeroen (1997). “The Loser's Curse and Information Aggregation in Common Value Auctions.” Econometrica 65: 1247–1281CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Pesendorfer, Wolfgang and Swinkels, Jeroen (2000). “Efficiency and Information Aggregation in Auctions.” American Economic Review 90(3): 499–525CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Roth, Alvin E. (1991). “A Natural Experiment in the Organization of Entry-Level Labor Markets: Regional Markets for New Physicians and Surgeons in the United Kingdom.” American Economic Review 81(3): 415–440Google ScholarPubMed
Roth, Alvin E. and Axel Ockenfels (2000). “Last Minute Bidding and the Rules for Ending Second-Price Auctions: Theory and Evidence from a Natural Experiment on the Internet.” NBER Working Paper: 7299CrossRef
Swinkels, Jeroen (2001). “Efficiency of Large Private Value Auctions.” Econometrica 69(1): 37–68CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Vickrey, William (1961). “Counterspeculation, Auctions, and Competitive Sealed Tenders.” Journal of Finance XVI: 8–37CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Wilson, Robert (1977). “A Bidding Model of Perfect Competition.” Review of Economic Studies 44: 511–518CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

  • Getting to Work
  • Paul Milgrom, Stanford University, California
  • Book: Putting Auction Theory to Work
  • Online publication: 05 June 2012
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511813825.004
Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

  • Getting to Work
  • Paul Milgrom, Stanford University, California
  • Book: Putting Auction Theory to Work
  • Online publication: 05 June 2012
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511813825.004
Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • Getting to Work
  • Paul Milgrom, Stanford University, California
  • Book: Putting Auction Theory to Work
  • Online publication: 05 June 2012
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511813825.004
Available formats
×