It is at the juncture of rights and needs that the dual character of the very concept of human rights is revealed. On the one hand, they constitute the moral standards and aspirations for humankind; human rights were declared as such by the United Nations in 1948. On the other hand, they are also increasingly understood as the norms of behavior enforced by international human rights law, as well as by national constitutions and statutes. One of the main goals for human rights movements has been precisely to translate moral standards and aspirations into enforceable legal rights.

The main difference between moral rights and legal rights relates to the methods for their enforcement. Moral rights usually provide a justified claim to something. They do not, however, provide an effective enforcement mechanism. If one's moral rights have been violated, one can appeal to the conscience of the perpetrator, to universal moral standards, to the voice of public opinion, or to the judgment of history. And even though such appeals are often convincing, overall, they do not constitute a formalized way to seek and receive relief or compensation for the underlying moral transgressions. In fact, in cases of most malevolent perpetration by the state, these methods are easily repressed. Legal rights, in contrast, may lack moral appeal, but they do provide efficient protection. One need not justify legal rights; one proves them. Thus, it is no wonder that human rights activists strive to codify human rights legally to grant them better protection.