The doctrine of central bank independence (CBI), as developed in the 1980s and 1990s, acquired an almost mystical status. The growing emphasis on CBI was one of the two principal characteristics of the second revolution in central banking, the other being inflation targeting. Central banks attained a higher level of prestige and influence in the 1990s than at any time since the 1920s. According to McNamara (2002), at least thirty-eight countries were granted ‘legal’ CBI between 1989 and 1999. Her list includes developed, developing, and transitional countries, but not those where CBI assumed a less formal character.

CBI is a difficult concept to define and measure; the associated concepts of accountability and transparency are no less slippery. Forder argues that ‘those with the most to gain from central bank independence are central banks’ (Forder 2002: 52). Yet the most ardent proponents of CBI were academic economists and politicians.