Overview

The two previous chapters in this section have explored a key question in thinking about the architecture of the mind: What is the large-scale organization of the mind? In Chapter 10 we looked at different models of modularity. The basic idea of modularity is that the mind is organized into dedicated cognitive systems (modules) that perform specialized information-processing tasks. In this chapter we explore a particular cognitive system that has received an enormous amount of attention from cognitive scientists in recent years – both from those sympathetic to ideas of modularity and from those opposed to it. We will look at what is often called mindreading. We can think of this as a very general label for the skills and abilities that allow us to make sense of other people and to coordinate our behavior with theirs. Our mindreading skills are fundamental to social understanding and social coordination.

Cognitive scientists have developed a sophisticated information-processing model of mindreading. This model emerged initially from studies of pretending in young children. Section 12.1 presents the information-processing model of pretense proposed by the developmental psychologist Alan Leslie. According to Leslie, pretending exploits the same information-processing mechanisms as mindreading. Section 12.2 looks at some experimental evidence supporting Leslie's model. Some of this evidence comes from the false belief task, testing young children's understanding that other people can have mistaken beliefs about the world.