Despite Moten's major role at this stage being to protect Wau, a message relayed from New Guinea Force headquarters on 2 March contained a general instruction from Blamey to Mackay for more pressure to be applied to the Japanese positions in front of Salamaua. The message stated: ‘I would be glad if you would give consideration to the question of inflicting a severe blow on the enemy in the Salamaua area with a view to seizing the opportunity should it present itself, since it may have far reaching results if successful.’

A General Staff minute issued on 16 March reinforced Blamey's view: ‘The C in C [Blamey] would undoubtedly like to see an advance towards Salamaua, and I believe that with caution, Moton [sic] may achieve something in accordance with the C in 's wish.’ Given that Moten's Kanga Force was the only Allied ground force in contact with the enemy in the entire South-West Pacific Area at that time, it is not surprising that higher commanders wanted to see some show of superiority over the Japanese. However, this directive would push the Australian army into the tangled web of terrain that guarded Salamaua. Although some limited attacks would be made in the Mubo area, Moten's ‘severe blow’ would come from another direction. He had decided to use Major George Warfe's 2/3rd Independent Company to make a wide flanking move into the west flank of the Japanese forces in front of Salamaua.