Introduction

The importance of competent headquarters and coherent planning to military success is demonstrated most clearly by the numerous historical occasions when command has failed. Notoriously, during the Franco-Prussian War, although the forces were broadly matched in terms of weaponry and numbers, the French Army suffered a series of catastrophic defeats culminating in Sedan on 1 September 1870. While the Prussian Army was co-ordinated by a potent and capable staff system, which disseminated clear and actionable orders to its corps, the French headquarters, under the now calumniated General MacMahon, was paralysed. Only hours before the final collapse, MacMahon sent out orders – unopened by at least one of his corps – which recommended that his forces should rest on the following day, even though the Prussian Army was at that very time encircling Sedan (Howard 2000: 206). The fractured corps of the French Army were quickly surrounded and destroyed. The Franco-Prussian War demonstrated the critical requirement of military forces: effective headquarters able to plan and command operations.

One of the most decisive changes to the armed forces in Europe since the end of the Cold War has occurred at the level of headquarters. In contrast to the Cold War, military headquarters and their commanders must now deploy and sustain forces, often at short notice, on complex global emergencies. They differ profoundly from military command during the Cold War, although, as we shall see, important operational continuities exist.