The theory of retaliation is not only incompatible with the concept of right of Kantian philosophy (see Part i) and of German idealism (see Part ii). Contrary to Kant's claims, it even proves itself to be a theory that respects the dignity in the criminal's person less than the alternatives of deterrence. Most radically, Nietzsche excludes the concern for human dignity both in the citizen's and in the criminal's person from being a motive and a plausible aim of retributive punishment. According to Nietzsche, the idea of retaliation allows no room for the necessary internalization and reflection out of which alone bad conscience and remorse in the criminal as well as humane interaction with society could arise (see Chapter 6).

In a deliberate move away from retributivism, I have made a plea in Part ii from the standpoint of a combination of specific deterrence and rehabilitation for a type of interaction that respects human dignity even with the most hardened and inhumane of criminals, that is, with those who have perpetrated crimes against humanity. Claus Roxin believes he raises a decisive objection against the “conception of specific deterrence” by accusing it of not wishing to accept its final consequences: