Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-5c6d5d7d68-vt8vv Total loading time: 0.001 Render date: 2024-08-16T03:17:22.915Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

5 - The age and mindset of the Napoleonic paradigm

from PART III - The Napoleonic paradigm and Total War

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 June 2012

Beatrice Heuser
Affiliation:
University of Reading
Get access

Summary

Napoleon was not a personality, but a principle.

(The Duke of Wellington in 1837)

Causes of wars, world-views and war aims 1792–1914

Chapters 2 and 3 charted the fluctuations and the constants in warfare prior to the French Revolution. From Cicero until the French Revolution, there was agreement in the Romano-Christian world that war could only be justified if it led to peace, and a better peace than previously. There were varied opinions about the importance of battle in warfare, and many counselled extreme restraint in seeking and giving battle. While military men wrote about victory in battle, writers of all professions were aware that a lost battle did not necessarily mean the end of war, and that victory in battle needed to be followed up in certain ways to lead to peace. Even though thinkers from Machiavelli, Urrea and Bernardino de Mendoza to Vattel favoured militias drawn from local populations, armies were more often than not multinational, composed of local levies and often foreign mercenaries.

Most of this changed dramatically with the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, known in Britain as the ‘Great War’ until the First World War claimed that epithet. They were a watershed not only in the conduct of war itself, but also in thinking about war (Ford 1963/4: 18–29). Without any technological revolution, the French fought differently, with much larger armies than Europe had seen since antiquity, reaching six-figure numbers under Napoleon. His organisation of armies into columns was one element of his success, but the new tactics applied by the French were aptly summarised by the Prussian General Valentini who saw it as the conduct of small (or ­irregular) war, but on a much larger scale (see Part VI of this book): in battle, France’s soldiers relinquished drilled formations and sought out the enemy individually, whether by careful targeting of their muskets, or with sabre or bayonet (Valentini 1779/1820: 1–3). When challenged by the royalist armies who sought to put King Louis XVI back on the throne, the French Revolutionaries fought for themselves and for their newly won liberties. They were inspired by new political ideals, and fought for their own cause, something which Count Jacques Antoine Hippolyte de Guibert had predicted would give them a very special force (Guibert 1772/1781: 138). The Napoleonic armies – composed of an increasing percentage of foreigners – fought for France, but above all for their charismatic leader, for honour and glory.

Type
Chapter
Information
The Evolution of Strategy
Thinking War from Antiquity to the Present
, pp. 113 - 136
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2010

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×