Many of the philosophical problems that were raised by Thomas Hobbes in the founding moments of modern political theory remain alive today; however, his solutions to these problems have been universally rejected. Because it is almost always characterized as an endorsement for overarching state power and a prescription for virtually unconditional obedience to the will of the great Leviathan, Hobbes's project appears to have little to offer to those interested in the limits of governmental authority and individual rights – the hallmark tenets of contemporary political theory. Thus, Hobbes's philosophy has been largely dismissed as lacking relevance in the current intellectual and political climate; and with few exceptions, his views have been relegated to the status of historical artifact – Hobbes is not seen as potential ally or even interlocutor.

In spite of its prevalence, this dismissal of Hobbes is much too hasty. It is based, at least in part, on the widely accepted but deeply mistaken view that Hobbes makes no interesting contributions to the debates concerning the limits of a person's obligation to obey the law. On the question of political resistance, the exclusion of a Hobbesian perspective is particularly acute: he is not taken seriously even as a potential opponent of those seeking to defend resistance to state power. Yet, a careful examination of his corpus reveals that Hobbes has an innovative and intriguing account of the instances in which resistance is justified.