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10 - New Directions in Law and Economics

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 July 2010

Alan O. Sykes
Affiliation:
Frank and Bernice Greenberg Professor of Law and Faculty Director for Curriculum, University of Chicago Law School
Michael Szenberg
Affiliation:
Pace University, New York
Lall Ramrattan
Affiliation:
University of California, Berkeley
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Summary

Law and economics began at the University of Chicago with the pioneering work of Henry Simons in the tax area and Aaron Director on antitrust. Ronald Coase contributed “The Problem of Social Cost,” sometimes said to be the most cited article in the history of economics, and launched the serious study of tort and property law from the economic perspective. The antitrust mantle was carried forward by such Chicago-connected scholars as Robert Bork, Frank Easterbrook, William Landes, and Richard Posner. Their critique of antitrust doctrine as it had emerged in the 1960s and 1970s revolutionized the field, so much so that Robert Bork claims substantial victory for Chicago school ideas in the afterword to the most recent edition of The Antitrust Paradox. Guido Calabresi at Yale introduced basic ideas of economics to the field of accident law, as Landes, Posner, and Steven Shavell at Harvard also labored to understand the economic implications of negligence, strict liability, joint and several liability, and other central features of tort doctrine. Serious work on contract law soon followed, such as Shavell's seminal work on contract remedies. The corporate area was also a natural target for economically oriented research. Chicago scholars Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel focused on the law governing changes in corporate control, for example, while Ralph Winter at Yale thoughtfully rebutted the suggestion that the state of Delaware had led corporate law racing toward the bottom, and Henry Manne wondered about the logic of insider trading rules.

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Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2004

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