Imre Lakatos was a follower of Popper's, but their views came into conflict shortly before Lakatos died. Lakatos' writings on the philosophy of science date from the late 1960s and early 1970s and had no role in the development of the alternative views discussed in chapter 9. Over the last two decades Lakatos has had a tremendous influence, exceeded only by Popper's.

Although Lakatos' views are a brilliant modification of Popper's, they fall prey to the same fundamental difficulties, and this chapter will conclude with some general words of appraisal concerning both Popper's and Lakatos' views. Despite his indebtedness to Popper, Lakatos defends a strikingly original vision of science that has fascinated the leading contemporary writers on economic methodology.

Sophisticated methodological falsificationism

Lakatos grants many of the criticisms I made of Popper in chapter 10, but he thinks them unfair, for Lakatos argues that Popper was moving toward a more sophisticated position to which the criticisms do not apply. Lakatos calls this new position, “sophisticated methodological falsificationism.” One can best grasp what sophisticated methodological falsificationism requires by contrasting its basic three rules of scientific conduct with the three rules of Popper's methodology (pp. 180–1 above).