Introduction

The high-profile and long-running transatlantic dispute over the European Union's banana import regime was widely perceived as a straightforward fracas between the EU on the one hand and the US and Latin American exporters on the other. In reality however, it involved a diverse mix of participants, including some of the world's smallest states, which had a decisive bearing on the evolution of the regime. Among the most determined and active were Caribbean exporters, led by the tiny Windward Islands. This study examines their performance, the implications for them of the outcome of the dispute and the lessons to be learnt, amongst the most intriguing of which is that their size does not automatically preclude small states from actually being more than passive onlookers in the processes of international decision-making that determine their future.

What was the dispute?

The trigger that precipitated the ‘banana war’ was the approach to the unification of the European Communities markets from 1 January 1993. Prior to this, the various Member States had operated their own import arrangements for bananas, in some cases applying a variety of tariff and quota restrictions. At one extreme was Germany with no import restrictions and at the other Spain, which effectively reserved its entire domestic market for bananas from the Canary Islands. Between these extremes were the range of import systems operated by the individual Member States. France maintained import duty and a virtual ban on bananas from Latin America though it provided import quotas for the bananas from francophone exporters in Africa.