This volume is devoted to Ulric Neisser's first two kinds of self-knowledge: ecological and interpersonal. My focus here is on the second of these, interpersonal knowledge. Pertinent writings by G. H. Mead and Martin Buber will be considered, then, in terms of how their writings contribute to, or differ from, Neisser's view (1988; see also this volume). At the risk of some redundancy, I begin by summarizing the main features of Neisser's account of the interpersonal self (1988, pp. 41-46).

Neisser opens by stating that this self is “engaged in immediate unreflective social interaction with another person.” When the actions of one person “mesh appropriately” with the actions of another, they create an occasion of intersubjectivity. This mutuality can be perceived both by the external observer and by the participants. Direct perception rather than inference is the basis of this mutuality or intersubjectivity. As studies of infants indicate, the interpersonal self is specifically oriented by and through expressive gestures; communication through gestures develops the interpersonal self. This process is “an emotional business: the two partners are obviously sharing an affect” (p. 44).