This book is part of a larger work, which seeks to expound and defend an agnostic stance on theistic matters. The larger work, most of which remains to be written, is intended to have four parts:

1. i. an examination of conceptions of deities, including a discussion of the consistency and mutual compatibility of allegedly divine attributes, and an examination of the structure and function of religious vocabulary;

2. ii. an examination of traditional arguments for and against the existence of various deities, including: ontological arguments, cosmological arguments, teleological arguments, arguments from evil, moral arguments, arguments from revelation, arguments from authority, arguments from religious experience, and arguments from miracles;

3. iii. an examination of formulations of agnosticism, including a comparative evaluation of formulations of theism and atheism; and

4. iv. an investigation of the epistemological merits of agnosticism, including a somewhat qualified defense.

Obviously, the present work is one subpart of part (ii). Not surprisingly, the main thesis that is defended in it is that ontological arguments do not provide an agnostic with any good reason to change her view - that is, to give up her agnosticism. One of the projected themes of the larger work is that the most fruitful approach to arguments in philosophy of religion is to ask: Do these arguments embody reasons for agnostics - atheists, theists - to change their views? That is, do these arguments embody considerations that reasonable and reflective agnostics - atheists, theists - must recognize as providing motivating reasons for them to change their views?