Policy arenas with multiple and interdependent functional purposes are common. Such fragmented policy arenas create institutional collective action (ICA) problems where activities in one functional area interfere with activities in another. This chapter explores the structure of fragmentation and the roles of two mechanisms for mitigating institutional collective action dilemmas: informal policy networks and collaborative institutions.

One of the best case studies for examining fragmentation is San Francisco Bay-Delta water policy, which combines several functional purposes including mitigating flood risks, obtaining water quality standards, protecting endangered species, and supplying water to farmers and urban areas. The San Francisco Bay-Delta water policy arena also involves a large number of actors from local, state, and federal governments and from private and nonprofit organizations. These actors vary in their level of agreement about the seriousness of water-related problems and support for policy alternatives (Munro 1993; Zafonte and Sabatier 1998; Hundley 2001; Heikkila and Gerlak 2005). This chapter examines the structure of the informal networks of allies and opponents in this fragmented and contentious arena, as well as the role of CALFED, a large collaborative institution.

INSTITUTIONAL COLLECTIVE ACTION HYPOTHESES

Analytical frameworks emphasize the important elements to study in a system, enabling the creation of theories and the derivation of hypotheses. A case in point is the ICA framework in Feiock and Scholz Chapter 1, which lays out broad guidelines for studying self-organizing governance.