Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of figures
- List of tables
- Acknowledgements
- Preface
- 1 Cabinets, foreign policies and case-studies
- 2 Constructing the Polish Guarantee, 15–31 March 1939
- 3 The Soviet question, April–August 1939
- 4 Entry into war, 1–3 September 1939
- 5 Reacting to the ‘peace offensive’, October 1939
- 6 To continue alone? May–July 1940
- 7 The longer term: War Aims and other committees, October 1940–June 1941
- 8 Decision-making in Cabinet
- Appendix 1 The Chamberlain Cabinet, 31 October 1938–3 September 1939
- Appendix 2 Attendance at the Foreign Policy Committee of the Cabinet, 14 November 1938–25 August 1939
- Appendix 3 Neville Chamberlain's statement in the House of Commons, 12 October 1939
- Appendix 4 Lord Halifax's paper for the War Aims Committee, October 1940
- Appendix 5 Anthony Eden's speech at the Mansion House, 29 May 1941 (extract)
- Notes
- Bibliography
- Index
- LSE MONOGRAPHS IN INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
3 - The Soviet question, April–August 1939
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 02 February 2010
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of figures
- List of tables
- Acknowledgements
- Preface
- 1 Cabinets, foreign policies and case-studies
- 2 Constructing the Polish Guarantee, 15–31 March 1939
- 3 The Soviet question, April–August 1939
- 4 Entry into war, 1–3 September 1939
- 5 Reacting to the ‘peace offensive’, October 1939
- 6 To continue alone? May–July 1940
- 7 The longer term: War Aims and other committees, October 1940–June 1941
- 8 Decision-making in Cabinet
- Appendix 1 The Chamberlain Cabinet, 31 October 1938–3 September 1939
- Appendix 2 Attendance at the Foreign Policy Committee of the Cabinet, 14 November 1938–25 August 1939
- Appendix 3 Neville Chamberlain's statement in the House of Commons, 12 October 1939
- Appendix 4 Lord Halifax's paper for the War Aims Committee, October 1940
- Appendix 5 Anthony Eden's speech at the Mansion House, 29 May 1941 (extract)
- Notes
- Bibliography
- Index
- LSE MONOGRAPHS IN INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
Summary
The problem of Anglo-Soviet relations in the later spring and summer of 1939 usefully provides both a parallel and a contrast to that of the Polish Guarantee. It was of equally vital importance to British foreign policy, both objectively and increasingly in terms of the way it was perceived by participants. Its outcomes, whatever they might be, would inevitably affect the military and political balance in Europe, since it involved the consideration of advance commitments to go to war. It was also seen as a pressing issue, although slightly less so than the events of March. Ministers rapidly recognised in April that continued German expansionism meant that relations between Britain and the USSR could no longer remain ill-defined. An immediate attempt to reach some kind of agreement had to be made. However, in contrast to the guarantee to Poland, the salience of this problem did not deeply disturb the central notions of British policy-makers about European politics. For it arose gradually out of the deliberations about Poland, and it was not a new or sudden trauma of itself. Indeed to some extent it was left-over business from those last two hectic weeks of March. Once the invasion of Prague had been assimilated, and the guarantee issued to Poland, the idea of concluding a full alliance with the USSR was not so radical as it would have seemed even six months previously. Moreover the proposals that emerged were formal, detailed and multifaceted. Both procedurally and substantively the contrasts and similarities between the March crisis and the Soviet negotiations throw interesting light on the relationship between policy-making and the problems with which it deals.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Cabinet Decisions on Foreign PolicyThe British Experience, October 1938–June 1941, pp. 48 - 84Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1991
- 2
- Cited by