Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-848d4c4894-4rdrl Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-07-01T05:07:21.675Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

2 - Monetary policy, capital controls and seigniorage in an open economy

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 February 2012

Get access

Summary

Introduction

Several European countries rely heavily on inflation tax revenues to finance their expenditures. Seigniorage accounted for between 6 and 12% of government revenues in Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain in the period 1979–86 (in contrast to generally less than one percent in most of the rest of Western Europe over the same period). These countries argue that reliance on the inflation tax is made necessary by a poorly developed tax base for regular taxes. The potential loss of seigniorage as a revenue source under alternative monetary and capital market arrangements is therefore a prime concern to these countries in analysing such arrangements. For example, the loss of revenues from a decreased inflation rate is crucial in a decision by some of these countries of whether or not to join the EMS.

A look at the data on revenue from money creation reveals that the issue is more complex than simply the revenue loss from reducing the inflation rate. The four high-seigniorage countries not only have higher inflation rates than their Northern neighbours, but have significantly higher monetary bases as well. (See Table 2.1, based on Giavazzi, 1988.) Disaggregating the monetary base, one sees that the significant difference is not in currency to GDP ratios, but in bank reserves (relative to GDP) which are an order of magnitude higher. The last two columns of the table explain why this is so.

Type
Chapter
Information
A European Central Bank?
Perspectives on Monetary Unification after Ten Years of the EMS
, pp. 13 - 52
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 1989

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×