INTRODUCTION

The two chapters by Terry Anderson (Chapter 12) and Don Coursey (Chapter 11) illustrate contrasting optimism and pessimism of the first two authors. Anderson is optimistic that privately negotiated agreements can make major contributions to saving endangered species and their habitats. He is pessimistic about “ … whether the [government] agency is producing what the citizen/agents desire” (Anderson, pp. 232). In contrast, Coursey appears optimistic that despite what he acknowledges as the shortcomings of the political process, “ … competition within the political system will generate a most preferred expenditure pattern across endangered animals” (Coursey, pp. 202). At least this is “the premise entertained throughout the analysis.” And a very entertaining premise it turns out to be in his chapter: Coursey tries to convince us that agency expenditures can be used for more than reflecting the agency's priorities among species protection efforts; they can be used for valuation. As discussed below, this suffers from several weaknesses, even if Anderson's pessimism about efficiency of government agency actions is overcome. Coursey's pessimism is directed toward nonmarket valuation techniques, even though they pass many of the tests Coursey sets as his standard.

The chapter by Watts et al. (Chapter 10) reflects the realism of actually quantifying the local economic impacts and national efficiency costs of critical habitat determinations with limited analysis budgets and time. This pragmatic chapter serves as a template for performing economic impact studies and at the same time determining if there is any real net cost to the nation as a whole.