The nature of reference

The term reference is generally held to hold between a linguistic expression and a referent (for example a particular individual or entity in the world). However the term has been used in a variety of ways and in this short introductory discussion of the nature of reference I shall begin by making use of the three-way terminological distinction introduced by Lyons (1977: chapter 7) between sense, denotation and reference. His account relates to that of Frege, who called attention to the importance of the distinction between sense and reference, a distinction widely accepted in philosophical discussion. However, Lyons uses the term sense to describe meaning relations holding between linguistic units. His use of the term denotation is in some respects closer to Frege's use of sense. The distinction between these terms is not always easy to maintain (though see Lyons' discussion of the issues in Lyons 1977). Despite the difficulties of drawing a clear boundary between these categories on all occasions, we shall nevertheless find it useful to call upon the distinction in analysing certain types of misunderstanding.

Sense

The term sense, as used by Lyons, applies to words taken out of context, as they are when they appear in a dictionary. (Strictly speaking the term applies not to words, but to those meaningful elements which are common to a set of words related in meaning, to lexemes.