The discussion thus far has focused on the personal scope of anational citizenship and its possible impact on international uses of nationality. Having discussed the conceptual underpinnings of such a model (see Chapters 2 and 3) and the rules concerning the acquisition and loss of citizenship (see Chapters 4 and 5), the discussion will now address the material scope of anational citizenship. The latter entails the substantive dimensions of citizenship; namely, rights, be they socio-economic, political or cultural, duties and civic responsibilities, political opportunities for participation, modes of community incorporation and, finally, identity formation and transformation.

A central question, and perhaps the most appropriate starting point, in such an inquiry is how much weight should be given to the notion of differentiated citizenship. As already mentioned in the introduction and Chapter 1, the idea of differentiated citizenship emerged as a response to the critique of liberal citizenship in the 1990s. Advocates of differentiated citizenship have argued that ostensibly neutral liberal norms and practices are, in reality, partial and biased, and that their ‘false’ universality has contributed to perpetuating structures of inequality and domination and to the maintenance of institutionally embedded privileges for certain groups. Against this background, differentiated rights and asymmetrical solutions might be an effective means of tackling inequality, empowering discriminated against groups and thus making democratic politics more reflective of diversity. Indeed, it is, precisely, the promise of a more inclusive politics entailed by differentiated citizenship that has made it appealing to diverse theoretical perspectives, such as liberalism, communitarianism and the ‘theory of recognition’.